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Introduction
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is considered one of the most important corporate disclosure and governance reforms in US history. As stated in the preamble of the Act, a primary objective of SOX is "to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures". Our aim in this paper is to shed light on the question whether SOX has achieved this objective. More specifically, we ask whether firms that are subject to SOX became less "opaque" following SOX, and if so whether this effect was more pronounced for some types of firms than for others.
We derive proxies for firm-level opaqueness from analyst earnings forecasts. 1 Specifically, we construct two variables that pertain to the ability of financial analysts to accurately predict earnings: forecast error and forecast dispersion. Forecast error is the relative distance between average earnings per share (EPS) forecasts and actual EPS, while forecast dispersion is the absolute value of the standard deviation of EPS forecasts divided by the mean. Forecast error measures how far the analyst consensus is from actual earnings, whereas forecast dispersion measures the degree of "disagreement" among analysts. We argue that either measure provides a natural proxy for the degree to which investors and other market participants perceive firms to be opaque.
The central challenge of our analysis has to do with the question how to control for contemporaneous influences that may affect opaqueness but cannot be attributed to SOX. We address this challenge by exploiting the fact that SOX not only applies to US domiciled listed firms but also to foreign firms that are cross-listed in the US. This allows us to devise a clean test where the change in opaqueness of SOX-affected cross-listed firms is compared against the change in opaqueness of their SOX-unaffected peers. To implement this approach, we adopt a difference-in-differences regression setting and focus on firms that are domiciled in the European Union (EU-15). Our main question is whether cross-listed EU-15 firms became less opaque after SOX, relative to comparable EU-15 firms that are not cross-listed. (2007) , and Bannier, Behr, and Guettler (2010). 2 The advantage of focusing on EU-15 firms is two-fold. First, as opposed to firms from, e.g., Asia or South America, the universe of EU-15 firms constitutes a sizable sample of treatment and control firms that are exposed to fairly similar economic conditions (except for SOX). Second, while some EU-15 countries had their own disclosure and governance reforms before or after SOX, these reforms were not only substantially different from SOX but also occurred at different points in time (an exception stems from the 2005 adoption of IFRS in the EU; we will come back to this below). This differs, for example, from Canada where the legislator passed a SOX-like reform in 2003 ("Bill 198") . Thus, to the extent that SOX and its Canadian equivalent are substitutes, a DID setting based on firms from Canada may underestimate the transparency-enhancing effect of SOX.
In implementing our research design, we face two additional identification issues. The first issue has to do with the fact that over our sample period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) ) a significant number of cross-listed firms delisted from US exchanges. If these firms were inherently more opaque than firms that did not delist, 3 we might spuriously detect an opaqueness-decreasing effect of SOX merely because over time relatively opaque firms dropped out of the sample of treatment firms. To address this "survivorship bias" problem, we limit the treatment sample in our main regressions to firms that were continuously cross-listed over the entire sample period. The second issue stems from the possibility that the treatment status could, in principle, be endogenous: firms may endogenously choose to delist in an attempt to avoid SOX-compliance. 4 To mitigate this concern, we provide as a robustness check an Our main finding is that while both treatment and control firms experienced a decrease in opaqueness following the passage and implementation of SOX, this decrease was significantly larger for cross-listed firms. In other words, relative to the sample of control firms, SOX-affected firms became less opaque. This finding is robust to controlling for a wide set of variables that may affect analyst earnings forecasts, to using firm as well as country-year fixed effects, and to accounting for delistings, endogeneity of the treatment status, and changes in corporate risk taking. 6 Our results are further robust to removing the 3 We do provide some evidence suggesting that this is indeed the case. 4 The question whether SOX actually induced firms to delist remains controversial. 6 We control for changes for risk taking to mitigate the concern that our results could be driven by a reduction in corporate risk taking, rather than an increase in transparency per se. Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2009) provide evidence suggesting that US firms reduced their risk taking following SOX. Litvak (2008) provides similar time series dimension and aggregating the data into a pre-and post-SOX period in order to address possible downward biases in the standard errors due to serial correlation in the error terms (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) . We also provide evidence suggesting that the opaqueness-decreasing effect of SOX was more pronounced for firms operating in relatively opaque industries, such as the technology sector and financial services.
A potential concern to our findings could be that contemporaneous disclosure-related regulatory changes in the EU, such as the adoption of IFRS in 2005, may be driving our results. Indeed, our finding that both cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms became less opaque over time may suggest that contemporaneous local reforms had a positive effect on transparency. This would be of major concern for our difference-in-differences analysis if firms that are cross-listed on US exchanges responded more positively to these local regulatory changes than firms that are not cross-listed (as in this case the effect of SOX on transparency would be overestimated). 7 We believe this is unlikely to be the case. As noncross-listed firms are not subject to US listing requirements and SEC oversight, it seems plausible that these firms are inherently more opaque than cross-listed firms (e.g., Lang, Lins, and Miller 2003, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004). We would thus expect that disclosurerelated reforms in the EU had a stronger effect on non-cross-listed firms than on cross-listed firms. Consistent with this view, Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2008) find that cross-listed firms experienced lower, if any, market liquidity benefits following the adoption of IFRS compared to firms that are not cross-listed. To the extent that liquidity is positively related to our transparency measures, their findings suggest that the adoption of IFRS in the EU had a stronger transparency-enhancing effect on non-cross-listed firms than on cross-listed firms. If anything, therefore, we would therefore expect our findings to underestimate rather than overestimate the effect of SOX on opaqueness. 8 We complement our analysis with evidence for a potential channel through which SOX could have affected opaqueness. To this end, we undertake a comprehensive textual analysis of corporate annual reports, and study how firms' disclosure and reporting behavior changed after the passage and implementation of SOX. 9 We subsequently compare the evidence for SOX-affected cross-listed firms. Using a structural estimation setting, Kang, Liu and Qi (2010) find that, relative to UK firms, US firms applied higher discount rates after 2002. 7 We employ country-year fixed effects to account for regulatory changes at the country level, e.g. domestic corporate governance codes, which affect treatment and control firms similarly. 8 Likewise, if SOX also affected the control firms because of governance externalities, this would bias our results against finding transparency effects that can be attributed to SOX. The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides a brief description of the institutional set-up, Section 3 contains a description of the data and the variables, and Section 4 reports the empirical findings. Section 5 provides evidence from a textual analysis of annual reports, and Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Background
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law on July 30, 2002. As stated in the preamble of the Act, its aim is "to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability and beyond constitute the "after SOX" period. We will subsequently show that our findings are robust to considering beginning of 2006 as an alternative cut-off date to account for the extension of Section 404 compliance deadlines.
Data and Summary Statistics
We gather analyst earnings forecast and actual EPS data from the IBES database. For reasons discussed in the Introduction, we focus on firms from the EU-15 countries. The sample period is 2001 to 2007. We focus on full-year EPS forecasts with a one-year forecasting horizon. This means that for each given firm we collect forecasts made in a given fiscal year for full-year earnings of that year. We restrict attention to EPS forecasts made within one quarter after the report date of previous full-year earnings. In case an analyst provides more than one EPS forecast within this period, we use the last forecast issued by the analyst within this period. We exclude firms for which we cannot compute our opaqueness measures in at least one year. This leaves us with a sample of 2,489 firms. The country distribution of the sample is reported in Table 1 . Forecast Dispersion measures the degree of "disagreement" among analysts. We argue that either measure provides a natural proxy for firm-level opaqueness. To be able to construct our measures, we require observations with at least two EPS estimates and non-zero actual and mean estimate EPS. We therefore disregard observations with only one EPS estimate or where actual EPS or mean estimate EPS are zero. To remove outliers, we winsorize our opaqueness measures at 5%. Our results are similar if we do not winsorize (reported in Table   8 ).
We identify cross-listed firms from the annual SEC lists of foreign companies registered and reporting with the SEC. 13 These lists contain all foreign companies registered and reporting with the SEC at year end. We do not consider firms that are traded on OTC markets. Furthermore, we exclude firms with market capitalizations below USD 75m, as As discussed in the Introduction, if firms that delisted during the sample period were inherently more opaque than firms that did not delist, 14 we might spuriously detect an opaqueness-reducing effect of SOX merely because over time relatively opaque firms dropped out of the sample of cross-listed firms. To avoid this "survivorship bias" problem,
we limit the treatment sample in our main specifications to firms that were continuously cross-listed over the entire sample period. Table 1 shows that the country-distribution of cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms is roughly similar. We document in the robustness section that our results are robust to excluding UK firms, which constitute the biggest country group, and firms from The Netherlands, which are somewhat overrepresented in the treatment group.
We complement our analyst data with information on firm characteristics from Datastream Worldscope. Table 2 
Empirical Results

Between Group Differences: Univariate Results
As explained above, we assume in a first step that the years 2001 to 2004 constitute the "before SOX" period, and the years 2005 to 2007 constitute the "after SOX" period. and those that were not (control group). While both groups of firms experienced a decrease in both Forecast Error and Forecast Dispersion in the years after SOX, the table shows that the decrease in both measures was significantly larger for firms that were cross-listed and hence subject to SOX. This provides some univariate evidence suggesting that, relative to the control group of firms that were not subject to SOX, cross-listed firms became less opaque following the implementation of SOX. Table 4 extends the univariate analysis from Table 3 to a difference-in-differences regression setting to control for a wide set of factors that may affect analyst forecasts. Our basic empirical specification is as follows: As control variables we include proxies for firm size and leverage. We further include the absolute value of the first difference in EPS scaled by previous year's EPS ("Surprise") to control for the fact that a large change in earnings is likely to increase forecast error and dispersion. We also include a dummy ("Loss") that is one whenever a firm had negative earnings in the previous year, and a dummy ("Quarter Report") that is one whenever a firm reports on a quarterly basis. Lastly, as governance and disclosure regulation may affect analyst following, which in turn may affect our opaqueness measures, we also control for the number of analysts over time ("Analyst Number"). and control firms' outcome variables followed a roughly similar trend. This is important since a key identifying assumption underlying our estimation approach is that the outcome variables of the treatment firms would have followed a similar trend as the outcome variables of the control firms if the treatment firms had not been subject to the treatment (e.g., Angrist
Multivariate Results
15 Note that Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the forecast error and forecast dispersion before taking the logarithm.
and Pischke 2009). While it is difficult to directly test the validity of this assumption, a common plausibility check is to verify whether the treatment and control firms' outcome variables followed a similar trend prior to the treatment. Figure 2 suggests that this is indeed the case. 16 One might expect that the documented effects of SOX are stronger for firms that are inherently opaque due to the nature of their business activities, and for firms that are located in countries with relatively weak domestic disclosure standards. To investigate these issues, we separate the sample firms based on (i) the industries they operate in, and (ii) the legal origin of their home countries. We assume that some industries are generally more opaque and exposed to information asymmetries vis-à-vis investors (e.g., because firms operating in these industries rely more on intangible assets). We consider the technology sector and financial services to be highly informationally sensitive industries, and the consumer goods, The results in Table 5 suggest that the effect of SOX was particularly pronounced for firms operating in informationally sensitive industries. The effects of SOX are both economically and statistically different between firms from the two different industry samples. We also provide some, albeit weak, evidence that SOX had a stronger impact on forecast dispersion in civil law countries than in common law countries: the coefficient of interest for firms from civil law countries is significant and exceeds (in terms of absolute sign) the corresponding coefficient for firms from common law countries. The difference between the two coefficients is moreover marginally significant (the p-value of a Wald-test comparing the two coefficients equals 11.11%). The results on forecast error are less conclusive as the difference between the two coefficients of interest is highly insignificant. 
Robustness Checks
where The IV estimates are reported in Table 7 . The standard errors of the IV regressions are robust and clustered at the firm level. The estimates show that our key coefficient remains negative and significant, even after accounting for the potential endogeneity of the crosslisting status. The results are very similar if we include firm fixed effects. and Leverage as controls.
In the first robustness check, the treatment group consists of firms that were crosslisted at the end of year 2000, regardless of whether they delisted at a later point in time.
Similar to the IV approach, this robustness check mitigates concerns that our results are biased due to the possibility that firms for which SOX would have a negative effect on transparency decided to delist to evade SOX-compliance. This would leave only those firms in the treatment sample for which SOX had a positive effect on transparency. Notice that we use a linear specification for the first stage models. As emphasized by Angrist and Krueger (2001), using probit or logit models in the first stage to instrument for dummy endogenous regressors would produce inconsistent second-stage estimators. By contrast, linear first stage models produce consistent secondstage estimators. 20 Even if this were the case, our baseline findings would still suggest that SOX increased transparency for firms that were cross-listed in the US and did not delist over the sample period.
dates for foreign issuers. In the fourth robustness check, the dependent variables are not winsorized. In the fifth robustness check, we restrict the control sample to firms with a market capitalization above USD 75m. We do this to mitigate concerns that our results may be driven by systematic size differences between the control and treatment firms. In the sixth robustness check, we exclude firms from the UK. Firms from the UK are the biggest group in the sample, making up about 30% of all observations. This analysis allows to assess to what extent our results are purely driven by UK firms. In the seventh robustness check, we exclude firms from the Netherlands, as these firms are somewhat overrepresented in the treatment group (cross-listed firms) compared to the control group (non-cross-listed firms). The estimates reported in Table 8 , rows 1 to 7, show that our results are generally robust to these various alternative specifications.
As emphasized by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), difference-indifferences regressions may produce downward biased standard errors due to the potential serial correlation in the error terms. We address this concern in our last robustness check.
Following a procedure proposed by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), we proceed by ignoring the time series dimension and averaging the data before and after SOX. We subsequently run our regressions using the averaged data. The results reported in Table 8 , row 8, show that the coefficient of interest remains significant for the forecast error measure.
Our results are weaker if we use forecast dispersion as the dependent variable. 
Textual Analysis of Annual Reports
Our results thus far suggest that, relative to a control sample of SOX-unaffected firms, cross-listed firms became less opaque following SOX. More specifically, we found that, relative to the control firms, cross-listed firms experienced a significantly stronger decrease in both analyst forecast dispersion and analyst forecast error. To understand a possible channel behind these findings, we conduct a comprehensive textual analysis of the annual reports of the firms in our sample. Textual analysis is increasingly used in finance and accounting to measure the tone and informational content of corporate documents (e.g.,
Loughran and McDonnald 2009, Li 2008, Antweiler and Frank 2004).
21 However, as discussed by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), this may be due to the low statistical power of this procedure. Power issues are likely to be particularly severe in our case where the sample size is relatively small (the treatment group consists only of 76 firms).
We expect that if SOX made firms less opaque, we should find some evidence in firms' annual reports pointing to such decreases in opaqueness. More specifically, we expect to find that the annual reports of SOX-affected firms became more comprehensive and provided more information about items that analysts deem particularly relevant for conducting accurate forecasts. We look at annual reports as they constitute an important, publicly disclosed source of information for analysts and the investor community at large, and contain information about the past, current and future earnings of a firm.
To perform our analysis, we collect the annual reports for the The firms in the control group were selected based on a country, industry, and size match from the full set of non-cross-listed EU-15 firms. We were able to find such matches and the required annual reports for 50 of the 76 cross-listed firms.
We develop eight measures for the annual report analysis based on a set of interviews that we ran with financial analysts to understand what they deem crucial for conducting accurate forecasts. Our first three measures are of a quantitative nature and measure the number of pages, the number of words, and the number of sentences with forward looking information in the annual reports. To measure the latter, we perform a textual analysis and define a set of 30 words that are likely to be associated with forward looking information (e.g., "anticipate", "expect", or "forecast"). We then count in how many sentences these words occur in the annual reports. Our next five measures are more of a qualitative nature and measure whether firms explicitly provide information on future risks or opportunities, provide an explicit statement of the expected future growth in earnings, and discuss unusual or nonrecurring events and their past effects on the company. Finally, we measure whether firms provide a comparison of the realization of opportunities, risks, and plans versus the expectations they had about these issues. For all these measures, we manually read and analyze all annual reports and create dummy variables taking the value 1 if we can find information on the above issues.
The corresponding results are reported in Table 9 , separately for cross-listed and noncross-listed firms. They show that for both types of firms annual reports became more comprehensive, provided more forward looking information, and discussed more items that are relevant for financial analysts when making financial forecasts. Most importantly, seven of the eight measures suggest that these changes have been more pronounced for cross-listed firms. These findings provide some indication for a possible channel through SOX could have reduced the opaqueness of firms.
Conclusions
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provides a natural experiment to study the effect of corporate governance and disclosure reform on corporate opaqueness. The reason is that SOX does not only apply to US-domiciled firms but also to cross-listed foreign firms. One can thus devise a clean test where changes in opaqueness of cross-listed firms that are subject to SOX are compared against changes in opaqueness of comparable firms that are not cross-listed and hence not subject to SOX.
Following this approach, we find that while both treatment and control firms experienced a reduction in opaqueness following SOX, this decrease was significantly larger for cross-listed firms. We construct proxies for firm-level opaqueness from analyst earnings forecasts. Our findings are robust to controlling for a wide set of variables that may affect analyst earnings forecasts, and to accounting for the potential endogeneity of the treatment status and changes in corporate risk taking. We find that the opaqueness-reducing effect of SOX was particularly pronounced for firms operating in informationally sensitive industries.
We also provide evidence for a channel through which SOX may have affected opaqueness by studying how disclosure and reporting in annual reports changed after SOX. 
Panel B: IV 2SLS Regressions
Dependent variable: This table presents coefficients of the interaction dummy (Post SOX * Cross-Listed) for various regression specifications. In the first robustness check, the treatment group consists of firms that were cross-listed in the US at the end of 2000 (regardless of whether they delisted at a later point in time). In the second robustness check, the treatment group consists of firms that were cross-listed in the US from end of 2000 to end of 2006. In the third robustness check, the Post SOX dummy takes the value 1 for the years 2006 and 2007 and 0 otherwise. In the fourth robustness check, the opaqueness measures are not winsorized at 5%. In the fifth robustness check, we restrict our sample to firms with a market capitalization above USD 75 million. In the sixth robustness check, we exclude firms from the UK. In the seventh robustness check, we exclude firms from The Netherlands. In the eighth robustness check, we remove the time series dimension by aggregating the data into a pre-and post-SOX period (Bertrand et al. 2004 reports for the "after SOX" period, and compare cross-listed firms (treatment group) with a matched sample of non-cross-listed firms (control group). The control firms were selected based on a country, industry, and size match from the full set of non-cross-listed EU-15 firms. We were able to find such matches and the required annual reports for 50 of the 76 cross-listed firms that were continuously cross-listed over the sample period. 
Cross-Listed
